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Some supporters of antidumping have argued that this procedure serves as a kind of “safety 
valve” for protectionist pressure.  This paper examines whether there is any empirical 
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Introduction 
Provisions for antidumping duties have long been a part of the multilateral trading system.  
Economists, by and large, have argued that these rules are distortionary practices that cause 
more economic harm than good.  Mankiw and Swagel (2005), for example, argue that 
United States economic welfare would benefit from a unilateral repeal of the antidumping 
laws. Proponents of the antidumping system such as Mastel (1998) argue that antidumping 
import restrictions are necessary to combat “unfair” trade by which foreign firms sell below 
“normal” value and cause economic harm to domestic industries.   
Other analysts such as Destler (1996) have pointed to another potential benefit of 
antidumping.  They argue that broad trade liberalization efforts have been enhanced by the 
presence and use of antidumping procedures.  These observers argue that antidumping rules 
are a useful “safety valve” by which protectionist pressure can be reduced on a narrow 
range of products even as governments reduce trade barriers across the economy as a 
whole.  If such a relationship could be demonstrated, then economists’ almost universally 
critical views of antidumping may need to be adjusted to account for one possible “upside” 
to the use of antidumping.   
This study represents the first attempt to evaluate empirically this safety valve 
argument for antidumping.  We use a new antidumping data set developed by the authors 
based primarily on individual governments’ antidumping publications and on Bown’s 
(2005) data set
1 to assess whether the number of antidumping initiations or the final 
imposition of antidumping duties have contributed to trade liberalization in a sample of 35  
                                                 
1 Many earlier studies of global antidumping use have relied on statistics compiled by the World Trade 
Organization.  Unfortunately, the government submissions on which these statistics are based are frequently 
incomplete or inaccurate.   2  
 
developed and developing countries for the 1988 to 2004 period.  We examine both 
initiations and imposed measures to help ascertain whether there are any differential effects 
of industry requests for duties (as proxied by initiations) or antidumping restrictions finally 
imposed.  We also control for macroeconomic conditions as well as for industry and 
country unobservables.   
Trade liberalization in this paper is defined as the percentage change in applied 
tariffs for each country at the three-digit ISIC level.  “Applied” tariffs are those in place and 
actually affecting trade flows, rather than those agreed upon at multilateral trade 
negotiations (i.e., “bound” rate).  Changes in applied tariffs represent the clearest and most 
easily interpreted modifications in trade policy in a given country.
2   
We find that there is some evidence that past antidumping actions are correlated 
with later reductions in tariff barriers.  There is, however, a strong divergence in experience 
between developed and developing countries in this regard.  While there is some evidence 
that the antidumping system is correlated with trade liberalization in developed countries, 
developing countries experience does not suggest such a relationship exists.   
This paper also contributes to the (very short) empirical literature on trade 
liberalization.  The few existing studies focus on specific countries experiences or use a 
case study approach.  Instead, our paper makes use of an extended sample of countries over 
a relatively long time horizon to try to reach general conclusions, although allowing for 
differences between developed and developing countries.  
The remainder of the paper is divided into the following sections.  Section I 
discusses the relevant literature.  Section II includes some descriptive statistics about tariff 
                                                 
2 The paper does not address other ways in which countries can liberalize such as changes in non-tariff 
barriers.   3  
 
reductions and antidumping use in the countries included in this study.  Section III lays out 
the econometric strategy along with a discussion of relevant variables for the study.  We 
discuss the empirical results in section IV for both the entire sample as well as separate 
discussion for developed and developing country experience.  Section V concludes with an 
interpretation of the results.   
 
I.  Literature Review  
The economics literature on antidumping encompasses a broad range of theoretical, 
empirical, and public policy analyses, all of which cannot be reviewed here.
3  There are 
major themes, however, present in the literature that are relevant to the present study.   
The first involves the spread of antidumping use to a host of new countries during 
the last twenty years.  Miranda et al. (1997) were the first to document the broad set of new 
antidumping users.  Prior to 1985, almost all antidumping investigations occurred in 
Australia, Canada, the European Union, New Zealand, and the United States.  Miranda et 
al. argue that the introduction of antidumping may have helped liberalization efforts in 
some countries by requiring governments to adhere to a rules-based import relief system 
rather than more arbitrary methods.  Prusa (2001) provides a more formal econometric 
analysis of the implications of the spread of antidumping to new users.  He finds that the 
use of antidumping has lead to large decreases in imports of affected products.  Zanardi 
(forthcoming) has provided further evidence for a more recent time period about how 
antidumping use has spread across the globe.   
Another strand of the literature looks at the impact of antidumping on the domestic  
                                                 
3 See Blonigen and Prusa (2003a) for a broad survey of the literature.     4  
 
economy.  Gallaway et al. (1998), for example, estimate that U.S. antidumping duties have 
reduced economic welfare in the U.S. by US$ 4 billion a year.  Vandenbussche and Zanardi 
(2006) provide recent evidence on how the antidumping system has reduced aggregate 
trade among traditional and new users.  In particular, they find that imports into traditional 
users are depressed because of the reputation that these users have built over time and 
because of current antidumping actions.  While a reputation effect does not seem to have 
emerged yet for new users, their antidumping actions have significant trade depressing 
effects leading to a reduction of their annual imports, on average, of around 6.7%. 
Recent work has focused on how the use of antidumping by one country can affect 
retaliation by another.  The argument is that the presence of antidumping may have 
provided an incentive for retaliatory restrictions by targeted countries.  Feinberg and 
Reynolds (forthcoming) and Prusa and Skeath (2002, 2004) find evidence that retaliation is 
a major determinant in explaining the recent explosion of antidumping cases.  For the 
United States, Blonigen and Bown (2003) find that firms’ decision to file a case against a 
particular country depends on that country’s power to possibly retaliate through the 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism.  More worrying is evidence that even the U.S. 
antidumping authority takes into account a country’s retaliatory power in its decisions. 
The “safety valve” argument views antidumping more sympathetically, primarily 
because it might represent the lesser of two evils.  Destler (1996) for example notes that the 
existence of AD laws in the U.S. may provide important “cover” for politicians who might 
otherwise succumb to protectionist pressures.  Moore and Suranovic (1992, 1994) argue 
that making antidumping procedures less accessible may push protection-seeking industries 
into more distortionary types of lobbying.  Finger and Nogués (2005) provide at least some   5  
 
anecdotal evidence for the safety valve argument for antidumping.  In interviews and case 
studies of Latin American officials, they find that broad trade liberalization was advanced 
by carefully managing antidumping (and safeguard) procedures.  Feinberg and Reynolds 
(2005) look at a slightly different but related issue.  They investigate whether there is any 
evidence that trade liberalization leads to more use of antidumping as domestic firms react 
to the resulting increased competition – and it seems that antidumping use increased for 
those countries engaging in larger tariff concessions at the Uruguay Round.   
There is clear evidence that at least U.S. policy-makers find the safety valve 
argument compelling, at least for public statements.  For example, in a May 2001 letter to 
the U.S. President, Senator Max Baucus, the leading Democrat for trade policy issues noted 
that “trade laws provide American workers and industries the guarantee that, if the United 
States pursues trade liberalization, it will also protect them against unfair foreign trade 
practices” (Baucus, 2001).   
Another important strand of the economics literature relevant for this study is the 
determinants of trade liberalization.  While there is a vast literature on factors that affect the 
provision of protection, there is remarkably little work on empirical studies of what factors 
help explain trade liberalization in various countries.  Work on the political economy of 
protection typically focuses on what factors help explain successful lobbying for protection 
(e.g., Helpman and Grossman (1994) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999)) or the determinants 
of specific protectionist trade outcomes (e.g., Moore (1992), Hansen and Prusa (1997), 
Baldwin (1985)).  But the current study is focusing, not on what factors are important in 
raising new import restrictions but instead what explains trade liberalization.   
As for the few studies trying to explain trade liberalization, Liu (2002) considers the   6  
 
determinants of Taiwan’s trade liberalization efforts from 1986 through 1995.  The author 
finds among other things that traditionally protected sectors were subject to slower 
liberalization.  The advantage of a case study approach is the availability of many country-
specific data, against the backdrop of lack of generality.  Ancharaz (2003) examines the 
factors that help explain trade policy reform in sub-Saharan Africa.  The author looks at, 
among other factors, macroeconomic variables like the current account, real GDP growth, 
and inflation and how they help explain trade reforms.  La Ferrara (1996) investigates the 
decision to conduct trade reforms but not their intensity and finds evidence that economic 
crises and support from multilateral agencies are important determinants for a sample of 
sub-Saharan countries. 
 
II.  Descriptive Statistics 
This study will examine the relationship between trade liberalization and the use of 
antidumping in 35 countries for the period 1988-2004.  Table 1 provides some basic 
information about the countries in the data set.  These particular countries were chosen 
because there is available data on sectoral tariff rates for the relevant period from the World 
Bank, which will form the basis of the dependent variable for the empirical work.
4   
In this paper, trade liberalization is defined as the percentage change in tariffs at the 
three-digit ISIC level (revision 2).  The percentage change is calculated from a base year 
and five years into the future.  We believe that five years is a time frame which would 
allow for most tariff changes to be phased in following a change in trade policy.  For a 
                                                 
4 Our empirical specifications will always include country fixed effects. For this reason, only countries with 
enough annual observations to construct at least two observations for trade liberalization can be included in 
the analysis. Such constraint explains why countries like South Korea and Taiwan are not part of the dataset.    7  
 

























where tk,i,t is the simple average of applied tariff rates in country k, sector i and year t.  
Thus, we define a reduction in tariffs in a sector as a positive number.  From Table 1, we 
see that this was a period of substantial tariff reductions for these nations;  the average 
(applied) unweighted tariff rate fell from 20 percent to just over 10 percent.
6  Similar 
patterns arise when the countries are broken up into developed and developing countries 
categories.  Column 1 shows that, not surprisingly, the average tariffs for developing 
countries in the first year of the sample are much higher (24.3 percent) than their higher 
income counterparts (7.1 percent).  Column 2 shows the analog for the final year in the 
database for each country.  Developed countries in the dataset reduced their applied tariffs 
to just over 3 percent, which represents a reduction of 56 percent compared to an average 
change in tariffs of approximately 47 percent for developing countries.
7  
Column 3 of Table 1 includes the total number of antidumping investigations 
launched in each country for the entire period.  We see that the U.S. is the most frequent 
user in the data set as whole with 559 investigations.  Among the developing countries, 
India has been the most frequent user of antidumping in the sample.  At this point, it is 
important to note that import-competing firms or their workers typically request the 
institution of an antidumping investigation (though governments can sometimes refuse to 
                                                 
5 For example, if tariff data is available for 1990 through 2001, one observation would be for the 1990-1995 
period and the second would be for 1995-2000.   
6 Note that the information in Table 1 does not include any agricultural or processed food categories.   
7 The averages across countries are not strictly comparable since they involve different time periods.     8  
 
begin the process).  Thus, the number of initiations is a measure of the access that domestic 
industries have to the antidumping process.  Column 4 of Table 1 displays the number of 
antidumping restrictions that were imposed.   
A measure of domestic firms’ success in the antidumping process can be roughly 
approximated as the ratio of measures to investigations.  From the last column in Table 1 
we see that about one half of antidumping investigations result in duties.  Developing and 
developed countries as a group reflect the same pattern.  We see that India reduced its 
average tariffs by 52 percent (from 58.3 to 28.1 percent) while approving just over 66 
percent of antidumping petitions.  Malaysia also approved a higher than average percentage 
of antidumping petitions (64.7 percent) while dropping average tariffs by 34 percent.  
These suggest at least the possibility that antidumping might have had some role to play in 
tariff reduction.  However, some of the countries that liberalized the most, including 
Indonesia (average tariff reduction of 71 percent), China (70 percent), and Brazil (68 
percent) had relatively small numbers of imposed duties as a percentage of initiated cases 
(40.5 percent, 25.8 percent, and 45.2 percent, respectively).   
At a sector level, Table 2 reports average trade liberalization and antidumping 
initiations and measures for the 29 industrial sectors included in the analysis.  On average, 
sectors liberalized by 10.9%.  However, there are huge differences across sectors:  beverage 
and tobacco registered an increase in trade protection of about 23.1% and 20.1%, 
respectively.  The other two agricultural sectors (i.e., sectors 311 and 312) are also among 
the categories with the lowest tariff reductions.  This is hardly a surprise and we will check 
the robustness of our results to the exclusion of these four sectors.  As for antidumping, the 
steel and chemical sectors confirm their reputation of heavy filers accounting for 27.3%   9  
 
and 26.7%, respectively, of total initiations (and very similar shares of measures).  The 
textile sector is a distant third with single digit rates of initiations and measures. 
 
III. Econometric Approach and Data Description 
We imagine that there are a number of factors that determine the degree to which tariffs are 
reduced in any particular country and industry.  On the one hand, initial macroeconomic 
conditions can constrain or enhance the ability of a government to undertake any policy 
reform, including changes in import restrictions.  The level of economic development may 
be correlated with a safety net for those who might bear adjustment costs associated with 
trade reform.  The economics literature has also focused on the political clout of particular 
industries in withstanding trade liberalization efforts.  In this particular study, we want to 
assess whether access to antidumping can act as a safety valve for protectionist pressure 
that could help smooth the path to more liberalization.   
We do not develop a formal theoretical model for the analysis.  Instead, we estimate 
a reduced form equation that will allow for various types of influences on the degree of 
tariff reduction.  Specifically, we assume that the percentage change in tariffs for industry 
sector i in country k in period t ('tk,i, t) can be written as: 

'tk,i,,t = GADk,i,t-5 + DXk,t-5 + EZi,t-5 + Hk,i,t      (2) 
 
where ADk,i,t-5 is a measure of antidumping activities five years previously (t-5) and Xk,t-5 
and Zi,t-5 are matrices of country and industry variables, respectively in that same earlier 
period.  The values G, Dand Eare vectors of weights (to be estimated) on these 
explanatory variables.  Note that we use lagged explanatory variables to avoid endogeneity   10  
 
problems; their values will be known in the base year used to calculate the tariff reduction.  
For example, tariff reductions (contemporary and past) may affect contemporary and future 
macroeconomic conditions but future tariff reductions will not affect past economic 
conditions.  A disturbance term is also included (Hk,i,t).  We will make various assumptions 
about this in the analysis to account for different types of fixed effects.   
  We have developed alternative versions of two separate measures of antidumping 
activity.  The first is the total number of antidumping investigations initiated (AD_INIT) in 
the base year used to calculate the tariff change for the particular country.  We interpret a 
positive coefficient as evidence that industries are more likely to accept trade liberalization 
in the subsequent five years if there has been easy access to an antidumping process.  A 
second version considers the total number of antidumping measures (i.e., duties and 
minimum price arrangements) imposed in that same year (AD_MEAS).
8  A large number 
for this variable means that agents in the economy can see that the antidumping process 
actually results in import restrictions.  In addition to the annual total for initiations and 
measures, we include second versions that total the number of initiations and measures for 
the base year and the two years prior (AD_INIT_3 and AD_MEAS_3).  These are meant to 
capture the country’s longer term experience in antidumping.  We also include a five year 
version of these variables (AD_INIT_5 and AD_MEAS_5) for sensitivity checks in some 
of the specifications. 
Two alternative versions of these antidumping control variables are created.  In 
section IV.A., we use total antidumping at the country level  (COUNTRY_AD_INIT,  
                                                 
8 Note that in many jurisdictions antidumping investigations might take as much as a year to complete so that 
the number of cases initiated and the number imposed in one year do not necessarily correspond even if all 
initiations were to result in antidumping measures.     11  
 
COUNTRY_AD_MEAS, COUNTRY_AD_INIT_3 and COUNTRY_AD_MEAS_3).  
These versions will control for the effects of country-wide use of antidumping.  For 
example, an industry facing calls for trade liberalization that has not yet used antidumping 
might be affected by other industries’ experience in the country.  The other version, 
included in section IV.B., calculates analogous variables for the specific industry 
(SECTOR_AD_INIT, SECTOR_AD_MEAS, SECTOR_AD_INIT_3 and 
SECTOR_AD_MEAS_3).  This will control for the particular sector’s experience with 
antidumping.   
The candidates for Xk,t-5 include variables that describe the macroeconomic 
conditions in the “base period” (t-5) that do not vary across industrial sectors.  The sources 
for these and other variables are included in Table 3.  In this regard, some of our regressors 
are the same as in Ancharaz (2003) although our empirical analysis is different in nature.  
He focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa to test whether economic crises enhance the extent of 
trade reforms.  In contrast, our sample is only determined by data availability and its wider 
coverage encompasses a range of countries and economic experiences.  Correspondingly, 
we will see that some of our results mirror his findings while others do not.   
  The first macroeconomic regressor is real gross domestic product per capita 
(GDP/CAP), which will control for the level of economic development in a country.
9  A 
positive value on this slope coefficient would suggest that the political pressures to resist 
trade liberalization would fall as average income increased.  This might be as a result of a 
more efficient set of policies that provide a social safety net so that those facing trade 
adjustment costs would be less likely to fight tariff reductions. A negative value might  
                                                 
9 Nominal GDP has been deflated using the GDP deflator.   12  
 
indicate that poorer countries are more likely to adopt trade liberalization as a means to 
eliminate economic inefficiency associated with protectionism.   
  The next macroeconomic variable is the average inflation rate in the base period and 
in the two previous years defined as the percentage change in the GDP deflator 
(INFLATION) or in the consumer prices when the GDP deflator is not available.  We do 
not have a priori expectations for this variable.  One might imagine that countries might 
use trade liberalization to fight inflation by increasing economic efficiency and lowering 
import prices.  Thus, higher inflation in the base period might be correlated with more trade 
liberalization, so that the coefficient on INFLATION would be positive.  One might also 
expect a positive coefficient for developing countries if IMF programs required trade 
liberalization.  A negative coefficient might suggest that policy makers in countries facing 
stable macroeconomic conditions (at least as proxied by price changes) might feel 
confident about reducing trade restrictions.   
  Another macroeconomic variable is the average of the annual percentage growth in 
per capita real GDP for the base period and the two previous years (GROWTH).  A positive 
coefficient might suggest that countries facing recent strong economic performance would 
be willing to reduce trade barriers in the coming years.  A negative value could indicate that 
policy-makers facing poor economic growth might try to use trade liberalization as an 
impetus to better economic performance.   
  Finally, we also include the average current account as a percentage of GDP 
(CA/GDP) for the base period and the two previous years.
10  Once again, the expected sign 
                                                 
10 Other macro variables could be included.  For example, Knetter and Prusa (2003) have shown that 
antidumping initiations are influenced by changes in the exchange rate, However, the possible effect of the 
exchange rate on trade liberalization is less obvious. We tried including measures of nominal and real 
exchange rates and the qualitative and quantitative results presented in the next section are unaffected while   13  
 
for this variable is ambiguous.  On the one hand, trade politics and mercantilist tendencies 
normally mean that leaders will find tariff reductions easier when a country has a large 
current account (adjusted for the size of the economy).  However, countries facing large 
current account deficits are large borrowers on international financial markets.  In some 
instances, especially in the developing world, this may lead to IMF programs that might 
involve trade policy reform.  Thus, one might be more likely to see a negative coefficient 
for developing countries.   
Trade liberalization is also potentially profoundly affected by important industry 
level effects within each country. Such effects might include trade orientation (net 
importing or exporting sector), employment and wage effects, value-added, profit 
conditions, and associated lobbying and political strength.  Unfortunately, while there are 
some of these series available for the particular countries from World Bank and other 
sources, there are many missing data.  We have therefore made a decision to control for 
these unobservable influences in some specifications of the model through combined 
industry and country fixed effects. 
  It will also be important to control for the initial levels of tariffs in the country.  We 
develop two alternative measures.  The first will allow us to control for more of the sectoral 
level variation in trade policy.  This variable, called SECTOR_TARIFF, is the average 
sector nominal tariff for the base year for each observation.  The second alternative is the 
simple average country-wide nominal tariff (COUNTRY_TARIFF) and therefore does not 
vary across sectors.  We also include the square of each of these variables to allow for non-
linearities.  A positive value on SECTOR_TARIFF would suggest that sectors with high 
barriers are more likely to see the greatest reductions.  A negative value would mean that 
                                                                                                                                                     
the exchange rate is significant only in some specifications.   14  
 
those same sectors can systematically withstand pressures for liberalization.  The 
interpretation for a positive coefficient COUNTRY_TARIFF is slightly different:  this 
might suggest that countries with higher overall tariffs are more likely to liberalize more.   
It is possible that the reaction of policy makers in developed and developing 
countries might different systematically for the explanatory variables.  Developing 
countries, many of which have faced much more troubled economic times in recent years 
than developed countries, might have different reasons for trade liberalization.  Similarly, 
developing countries are relatively new users of antidumping procedures so that their 
relation to trade liberalization might differ from developed countries, especially those that 
have used antidumping for many years.  Consequently, we will divide the sample into 
developed and developing country samples in the econometric work below. 
The list of regressors does not control for GATT/WTO membership and existence 
of antidumping laws for a particular country.  The reason is that there is little variation in 
such dummies for the countries and years in our dataset.  In fact, countries belonging to the 
GATT/WTO account for 85% (91%) of the base (final) year observations.  Similarly, 73% 
(84%) of the base (final) year observations relate to countries with antidumping laws.  For 
these reasons, we decide not to include such dummy variables that would basically act as 
simple mean shifters in combination with country (or country/industry) fixed effects. 
 
IV.  Regression Results 
We discuss regression results in two separate sections.  The first includes all 35 countries in 
the database and the second will split the sample into developed (8 nations
11) and  
                                                 
11 The European Union will be treated as one “country” since members follow a common trade policy.     15  
 
developing (27 nations) country samples.  Each section includes results with industry-, 
country-, and country/industry fixed effects.  In all regressions, the dependent variable is 
the percentage change in the tariff levels for each of the 29 three-digit ISIC categories.  For 
all the specifications we report robust standard errors.   
 
IV.A.  Outcomes with Country and Industry Specific Effects 
In Table 4, we display the regression output for the combined sample which includes 2261 
total observations for 35 nations.  Table 4 includes the results when there are no combined 
country/industry fixed effects though we do allow for separate industry and country dummy 
variables.  Various controls for macroeconomic conditions in the countries are included.  
The first two columns explore explanations for trade liberalization in the absence of any 
impact from the use of antidumping.  The remaining columns include those potential 
effects.   
  In column 1, we control only for country fixed effects in the regression as well as 
the macroeconomic variables.
12  In this specification, all macroeconomic controls are 
significantly different from zero except GROWTH.  We see evidence that nations with 
higher initial tariffs tend to liberalize more (since TARIFF is positive) but that this 
relationship falls with higher-and-higher tariff levels (TARIFF-SQUARED is negative).  
This suggests that countries with very high average tariff levels may be reluctant to 
liberalize.  The result for lagged per capita income (GDP/CAP) suggests that countries 
starting at higher levels of economic development tend to liberalize more.  The result for 
INFLATION is evidence that countries facing economic stress through high inflation are 
                                                 
12 The parameter estimates for all fixed effects in this study are suppressed for reasons of space but are 
available upon request.     16  
 
reluctant to reduce trade barriers.
13  This may be somewhat surprising since trade 
liberalization could be seen as a way to fight higher prices through improved economic 
efficiency and lower import prices.  Indeed, Ancharaz (2003) finds evidence that higher 
inflation leads to trade liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, but this is never the case in our 
various specifications.  We also see that countries with current account surpluses are more 
likely to liberalize than those with deficit (CA/GDP has a positive and significant 
coefficient).  There is however little evidence in this specification that economic growth is 
positively correlated with trade liberalization.  These last two results matching Ancharaz 
(2003) findings.   
  Column 2 of Table 4 repeats the exercise of the first column but includes both 
country and industry fixed effects.  The results are essentially identical.  A formal test that 
the country fixed effects are jointly zero yields an F-statistic of 34.2 and a marginal 
significance less than 0.01 percent.  Not surprisingly, there seem to be unobserved country 
conditions that help explain the pattern of trade liberalization.  In contrast, there is strong 
evidence that all industry specific effects are jointly zero (with a marginal significance of 
28 percent).  This latter result might be surprising at first blush since it suggests that 
unobservables at the industry level are not important.  But it is important to remember that 
these are common industry effects across countries; we will come back to specifications 
that consider country/industry fixed effects in later specifications.   
We now turn to the key questions in this research –the possible role of antidumping 
in the liberalization process.  As noted above, two different versions are used, one of which 
is antidumping initiations and the second is measures finally imposed.  Recall that typically 
                                                 
13 In regressions not reported here, we included INFLATION squared but found little evidence of a non-linear 
effect similar to TARIFF-SQUARED.   17  
 
domestic firms rather than governments initiate antidumping petitions so that this number 
reflects requests from import-competing firms for protection.  The final imposition of 
antidumping measures reflects instead the decisions of governments to grant protection.  
These two measures will therefore let us explore whether it is industry access to an 
antidumping process or actual protection under the system that might be important to tariff 
reduction. 
As we discussed above, four particular antidumping specifications are employed.  
COUNTRY_AD_INIT is the total number of investigations initiation in the particular 
country in the base year for trade liberalization.  This controls for the contemporaneous 
antidumping policy environment.  The second specification (COUNTRY_AD_INIT_3) is 
the total number of initiations of antidumping investigations during the base year plus the 
two previous years and would take into account recent antidumping experience, not just a 
single year.  The third version (COUNTRY_AD_MEAS) is the analog to 
COUNTRY_AD_INIT but is the total number of antidumping measures that are actually 
imposed in the base year.  The fourth version (COUNTRY_AD_MEAS_3) is the total 
number of antidumping duty orders put in place by the country in the base year and the two 
earlier years. 
  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 include the results of the two specifications (with 
industry and country fixed effects included) for the contemporaneous data.  In column 3, 
we see little evidence that COUNTRY_AD_INIT helps explain trade liberalization, though 
it does have a positive sign.  In contrast, the coefficient on the total number of antidumping 
measures in the base year (COUNTRY_AD_MEAS) is significantly different from zero at 
a one percent significance level.  These two results suggest that it might be more important   18  
 
that antidumping measures are actually put in place rather than just having firms able to 
petition the government for import relief.  The coefficient estimate for 
COUNTRY_AD_MEAS is surprisingly large:  one more antidumping order imposed may 
lead to as much as a 1.3 percentage point increase in average tariff reduction.   
  Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 display the regression output when the total number of 
initiations and measures for three years is included.  We see that the total number of 
antidumping investigations initiated is positively correlated with sectoral trade 
liberalization; the coefficient estimate for AD_INIT_3 is statistically different from zero at 
a one percent level with a t-statistic of 6.96.  These results carry through in column 6 when 
we include AD_MEAS_3. Thus, there are at least some indications that the antidumping 
process has contributed to the reduction of tariffs in the sample period.  If these results hold 
up in other specifications, they might suggest a possible important past role for 
antidumping in trade liberalization in the sample countries.   
  We also investigate whether the experience of developed and developing countries 
might be different.  This seems plausible for three reasons.  First, the coefficient on 
GDP/CAP suggests that trade liberalization varies across average incomes.  Furthermore, 
developed countries have a longer history of trade liberalization and start the sample period 
with much lower tariffs.  Finally most developed countries in the sample have a much 
longer and more extensive experience with antidumping. 
  Tables 5 and 6 repeat the output of columns 2-6 of Table 4 but break up the sample 
based on the level of economic development.  The countries included in each sample are 
indicated in Table 1. 
Table 5 shows the results for the 8 developed countries and involves 582   19  
 
observations.  The results for the macroeconomic variables for developed countries are 
broadly consistent with the results for the entire sample.  For example, with the exception 
of one specification, TARIFF and TARIFF-SQUARED remain significant at a one percent 
level with positive and negative coefficients, respectively.  We also see that a higher base 
period per-capita GDP is associated with greater trade liberalization so that even among 
developed countries, higher income countries are more likely to embrace openness.  And 
once again, developed countries with higher current account surpluses as a percentage of 
GDP are more likely to accept lower import restrictions.  However, the coefficient for 
INFLATION is sometimes positive (but never significant) and sometimes negative (and 
significant) for the developed country results in Table 5.  It is therefore difficult to assign a 
common interpretation for the impact of this variable.  This result mainly reflects the 
relatively low level of variance for this variable among developed countries.  In addition, 
while the coefficient on GROWTH was generally not significant for the whole sample, it is 
positive with a marginal significance below one percent in all specifications for developed 
countries.  These two results taken together may indicate that developed country policy 
makers pay more attention to economic growth than inflation when setting trade policy.   
  We turn now to the correlation of antidumping with tariff reduction for developed 
countries.  It is clear from the results that the developed country experience mirrors that of 
the entire sample –use of antidumping is correlated with more trade liberalization.  We see 
in columns 2 and 3 that contemporaneous antidumping initiations and imposed measures 
are both significantly different from zero at less than a one percent level.  Similarly, 
COUNTRY_AD_INIT_3 and COUNTRY_AD_MEAS_3 are both highly significant in the 
regressions reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5.  The combination of these results   20  
 
suggests that developed countries’ experience with antidumping may have indeed helped 
trade liberalization efforts as antidumping proponents have long contended.  Finally, it is 
worth noting the relative sizes of the coefficient estimates on the antidumping variables.  In 
particular, the coefficients for both versions of antidumping initiations are much smaller 
than those for antidumping measures actually imposed.  This is consistent with the 
interpretation that access to an antidumping system is less important to trade liberalization 
than imposing final antidumping duties;  both may be important to a credible operation of a 
“safety valve” but actually limiting imports seem to be much more important, at least in 
developed countries.   
  In Table 6, we report the results for the subgroup of 27 developing countries.  We 
see that developing and developed country trade liberalization experience is similar for a 
number of explanatory variables.  For example, the results for TARIFF and 
TARIF_SQUARED mimic those of the earlier complete and developed country samples:  
sectors with higher tariffs liberalize more but this result falls off for very high initial tariffs.  
We also see that GDP/CAP and the current account as a percentage of GDP (CA/GDP) 
enter positively (and significantly different from zero) for developing countries as well.  
These results suggest common experience among developed and developing countries for a 
number of different factors –high incomes, current account surpluses, and high initial tariffs 
are correlated with greater reduction in trade barriers.   
The patterns for other macroeconomic variables are more divergent across 
developed and developing countries.  In stark contrast to developed nations, higher growth 
in developing countries is associated with lower reductions in less tariff reduction.  This 
may reflect a belief among developing country policy makers that trade liberalization is a   21  
 
response to weak economic growth whereas developed country leaders may be hesitant to 
liberalize during similar economic downturns.  The coefficient on INFLATION is also 
quite different for developing nations;  it is negative and significantly different from zero at 
a 1 percent level in all specifications in Table 6.  In other words, higher inflation seems to 
make developing nations more wary about reducing tariffs.   
  The most important results for this paper, however, correspond to the estimates for 
the various antidumping variables for developing countries.  In particular, we see no 
evidence for these nations that the use of antidumping has contributed in any systematic 
way to trade liberalization.  The results displayed in the last four columns of Table 6 show 
that the only statistically significant coefficients are found for COUNTRY_AD_INIT and 
COUNTRY_AD_MEAS_3. The latter estimate is negative suggesting that imposing duties 
has hurt rather than helped trade liberalization.  Overall, these results do not provide 
unequivocal evidence that antidumping is necessary for trade liberalization, at least among 
developing countries.   
  In conclusion, we find that the effects of some explanatory variables for trade 
liberalization are similar across developed and developing country, most notably, real per 
capita income, initial tariff levels and current account size.  However, we see very different 
results for economic growth and inflation.  Most importantly for this study, there are strong 
indications that these two groups of countries have had very different experiences with 
antidumping.   
 
IV. B.  Outcomes with Country/Industry Specific Effects 
The regressions above have a major potential shortcoming since they do not control for   22  
 
country/industry fixed effects.  It is certainly plausible that tariff reductions are affected 
profoundly by the experience by a particular industry in a particular country.  In this 
section, we try to exploit some of the variation at the country/industry level.   
  We try to control for country/industry specific effects through three measures. 
  The first involves initial sectoral tariffs.  We include the industry’s initial tariff level 
(SECTOR_TARIFF) and its square (SECTOR_TARIFF_SQUARED) in place of the 
analogs calculated for country averages as in the previous section.  These values control at 
least part of any past political economy effects and industry shocks at the sectoral level in 
each country.  For example, industries with strong clout or have been favored by 
governments in the past may have higher initial tariffs.   
  We also use antidumping data at the individual industry level.  In the previous 
section, we included only the total number of antidumping investigations or measures in the 
country.  Here we include the number of antidumping investigations initiation 
contemporaneous to the tariff reduction’s base year (SECTOR_AD_INIT) as well as for a 
three year period (SECTOR_AD_INIT_3) as well as the analogs for the antidumping 
orders in place (SECTOR_AD_MEAS) as well as for a three year period 
(SECTOR_AD_MEAS_3).  We also include one final version for antidumping in this 
section as a sensitivity test:  SECTOR_AD_INIT_5 and SECTOR_AD_MEAS_5 are five 
year versions of these variables.   
Finally, we control for unobservable effects at the sector level by country by 
country/industry fixed effects.   
The results for the separated developed and developing country samples are 
displayed in Tables 7 and 8 below.  We see that much more of the variation in the   23  
 
dependent variable is explained when exploiting the country/industry variation compared to 
the earlier specifications.   
The results for most of the macroeconomic control variables for developed 
countries (Table 7) are very similar to those in Table 5. However, we do see that the 
coefficient on INFLATION has a much more stable pattern in this specification and is 
consistently negative and significantly different from zero at a 5 percent level in each 
column.   
The antidumping variables provide less explanatory power in this version of the 
econometric model for developed countries.  The parameter estimates for the 
contemporaneous number of antidumping initiations (SECTOR_AD_INIT) and measures 
(SECTOR_AD_MEAS) are both positive and significantly different from zero, though the 
latter only at 7.4 percent.  We also see that the impact of sectoral antidumping use on trade 
liberalization is sensitive to the time frame used.  In particular, columns 3-6 show the 3- 
and 5-year versions of the antidumping variables.  The point estimates for the initiations 
variables fall as the time frame is extended (1.5 vs. 0.49 vs. 0.43), and also their 
significance decreases from one percent to insignificant.  The same pattern for the point 
estimates holds for the “measures” variable (2.2 vs. 0.79 vs. -0.37) with only 
SECTOR_AD_MEAS significantly different from zero although only at 10 percent level.   
There are at least two interpretations for these results for developed countries.  The 
first is that the antidumping results are not robust to slightly different versions.  The second 
is that antidumping does act as a safety valve but that industries have a short time horizon:  
very recent antidumping investigations and duties might help industries acquiesce to tariff 
reductions but past antidumping activity is discounted heavily.     24  
 
In Table 8 we display the results when developing countries are included with 
country/industry fixed effects and sectoral variation in the control variables.  We see that 
the general pattern that exists for macroeconomic variables in Table 8 are mirrored in Table 
6.  Most importantly, we find once again little evidence that antidumping use has been 
closely associated with tariff reductions in developing countries.  All versions for 
antidumping initiations and measures imposed (contemporaneous, 3-year and 5-year stock) 
are insignificant.  Recall that in the earlier version for developing countries (Table 6) we 
only found two statistically significant coefficients – and the one for 
COUNTRY_AD_MEAS_3 was negative.  In other words, we have found no consistent 
patterns in either versions of the econometric model between the antidumping system and 
developing country experience with trade liberalization.   
 
IV. C.  Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, we present a short description of other specifications we examined that 
assess the robustness of our results.
14  
  One potential problem exists in the analysis that is especially relevant for 
developed countries. As noted above, the tariffs used in constructing the dependent 
variables are the applied (i.e., statutory) rather than bound (i.e., those agreed upon at 
multilateral trade negotiations) rates.  For many developing countries, there is a substantial 
“overhang,” (i.e., the bound tariffs are much higher than applied tariffs) so that there is 
significant discretion available to governments that want to change their trade policy 
without violating international commitments.  Using the latter, as we have in this study so 
                                                 
14 Not all the estimation results are reported in order to save on space but they are available on request.   25  
 
far, is thus an appropriate measure of the way in which developing country governments 
react to a changing economic and political environment.   
  In contrast, many developed countries have applied tariffs very close to their 
bound tariffs so that changes in sectoral tariff rates in any particular sector could simply 
represent the government implementing past multilateral trade agreements.  Francois and 
Martin (2003) report post Uruguay Round average binding overhangs (i.e., the gap between 
bound and applied rates) of only 0.4, 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points in the EU, Japan and the 
U.S., respectively.  In comparison, Brazilian and Indian binding overhangs were 14.9 and 
3.9 percentage points.  We therefore conduct a sensitivity test for developed countries alone 
by forcing the periods of analysis to be the five years prior and subsequent to the 
completion of the Uruguay Round.  This data strategy does reduce the developed country 
sample size from 582 to 251 observations. 
  The results are displayed in columns 1 through 3 in Table 9 and are analogous to 
the same columns in Table 7.  The estimates for the macroeconomic variables are generally 
similar to the earlier version in terms of signs and significance.  The one exception is for 
CA/GDP; in this specification, a larger surplus is associated with less liberalization.  This 
may reflect the experience of the United States, which had a significant current account 
deficit during this period but nonetheless liberalized. 
  The results for the antidumping variables are weaker than in Table 7.  The only 
coefficient estimated to be significantly different from zero is for the contemporaneous 
number of initiations (SECTOR_AD_INIT) but with a marginal significance of only 7.5 
percent.  All other antidumping variables seem not to explain tariff liberalization in the 
immediate pre- and post-Uruguay Round period.   26  
 
  Another conceptual concern might be that we have included countries that either 
did not have an antidumping law or did not invoke the law in the period under study. For 
the first concern, we exclude all countries without an antidumping process in place (i.e., 
Nepal, Oman, Switzerland, Tanzania).  The results for developed countries without 
Switzerland are qualitatively identical to those presented in Table 7.  When developing 
countries without antidumping laws are excluded, the coefficient for per capita income 
growth (which was reported in Table 8 as insignificant) is negative and significantly 
different from zero at a five percent level but the antidumping regressors remain 
insignificant.  We also exclude countries that never used antidumping (whether they had a 
law or not).  For developed countries, this means dropping Norway in addition to 
Switzerland.  Bangladesh, Nepal, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Tanzania are excluded for the 
developing country sample.  These results mirror those noted above in this paragraph.
15  
  Another potential problem is that our dependent variable is censored at 100 since 
tariff rates cannot be negative.  There are only 25 of such occurrences in our dataset and all 
for developed countries.  Such a small proportion of censored observations should not bias 
the OLS results.  In any case, we use tobit regressions for developed countries to properly 
address this problem.  As expected, there are no qualitatively or quantitative differences 
with respect to the estimation results presented in Table 7 (except that 
SECTOR_AD_MEAS_3 is significant at 10%). 
  Developing countries liberalization efforts also differ from developed countries 
since the former are sometime recipients of significant foreign aid flows or subject to IMF 
                                                 
15 We also used specifications that excluded food-processing sectors (ISIC 311-314) since agriculture-related 
sectors may have different political considerations.  In another sensitivity check, the United States, a country 
with fervent antidumping supporters, was also excluded.  These perturbations did not change the qualitative 
results of the estimation results.   27  
 
programs.  In the final columns of Table 9, we report results for developing countries when 
we control for three types of three year totals of international financial flows (all of which 
are lagged five years from the end of the trade liberalization episode): 1) IMF 
nonconcessional loans;  2) International Development Association (IDA) loans;  and 3) 
World Bank (IBRD) loans.  The first of these involves loans that come as part of reform 
packages for countries with balance of payments crises.  We expect the dispersal of these 
funds to be positively correlated with trade liberalization since the IMF generally supports 
trade reform.  The latter two, both of which involve concessional loans, have an ambiguous 
sign;  perhaps they help developing countries push through trade policy reform or may 
allow countries to avoid the painful process of reducing tariffs.   
  We see in columns 5 through 8 of Table 9 that IMF loans are positively correlated 
with trade liberalization while IDA loans seem to discourage reduction in trade barriers and 
IBRD loans are not statistically significant determinants.
16  Once again, however, we see no 
evidence for developing countries that the various measures of antidumping activity are 
positively correlated with trade liberalization.   
  We conclude by discussing one final robustness test.  The trade liberalization 
measure we have used up to this point is the simple percentage change in tariffs.  As Finger 
et al. (1996) have noted, this treats a tariff level change from 2 percent to 1 percent as 
identical to a change from 40 to 20 percent.  Consequently, we followed their lead and re-
ran our regressions using   
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16 The same results obtain if these financial flows are included one at the time instead of all together. The 
highest correlation among these three variables is only –0.33.   28  
 
  The results, not reported here but available upon request, suggest that some of the 
results for the use of antidumping are sensitive to this change.
17  For the entire sample of 
developed and developing countries using only country-wide use of antidumping (i.e., 
analogous to Table 4), we find that the number of antidumping investigations 
(COUNTRY_AD_INIT) is now negative and significant at a 1 percent level while the totals 
of investigations (COUNTRY_AD_INIT_3) and measures imposed 
(COUNTRY_AD_MEAS_3), which were positive and significant at a one percent level in 
Table 4, are no longer statistically significant.   
  The results for antidumping among developed countries (analogous to Table 5) are 
essentially unchanged by the new specification.  For developing countries (i.e., similar to 
Table 6), we find that COUNTRY_AD_INIT, which was positive and significant at a five 
percent level in the original specification no longer retains that explanatory power while 
COUNTRY_AD_MEAS_3 maintains its negative sign and is now significantly different 
from zero at one percent.   
  But the most notable changes in the new specification is when we look at sectoral 
variation for developing countries (analogous to Table 8).  We find that all antidumping 
variables are now negatively correlated with trade liberalization in developing countries 
and all are significantly different from zero.  This of course is consistent with a world in 




                                                 
17 As in Finger et al. (1996), the formula in (3) is implemented with the denominator being one plus the 
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V.  Conclusions 
This paper represents the first attempt to evaluate econometrically whether past use of 
antidumping helps explain later trade liberalization, defined as percentage change in 
applied tariffs, in a group of 8 developed and 27 developing countries.  We control for 
macroeconomic conditions, initial tariff levels both at the national and sectoral level, 
industry and country fixed effects and then consider how both the initiation of new 
antidumping investigations as well as the imposition of final antidumping duties affect 
reductions in tariff rates in a subsequent period.  The particular form of antidumping 
activity in the analysis is the number of investigations launched or the number of measures 
imposed in a base year as well as other versions with a longer time frame (either three or 
five years).  We then analyze what factors explain percentage tariff changes in each three-
digit ISIC industrial category five years hence.  
  The initial regression models (Tables 4 through 6) only exploit variation at the 
national level in the explanatory variables.  Evidence for these regressions indicates that 
when both groups of countries are combined in a single dataset that there is some evidence 
that antidumping use is correlated with later tariff reductions.  In particular, the coefficients 
for antidumping measures imposed in the base year for the trade liberalization, as well as 
for the three year total of antidumping investigations and imposed measures prior to the 
tariff changes, are all positive and significantly different from zero.  The estimates suggest 
than an increase of one case in the three year total number of new investigations could lead 
to an increase in average tariff reductions by 0.24 percentage points.   
  These results must be treated with significant caution however.  We do not have 
access to the value of trade affected in each of these antidumping cases so that   30  
 
investigations involving small and large amounts of trade are treated symmetrically in the 
data.  Government data on which the database is developed often do not list details about 
the level of duties imposed so that antidumping duties of 2 percent and 50 percent have the 
same weight in the regressions.  If these data were subsequently available on a systematic 
basis, more definite statements could be made. 
But perhaps the most important caveat is that the statistical significance of the 
antidumping variables is not invariant to the econometric specification or the subsample 
used for the estimation.  For example, the results in the previous paragraph are driven 
almost entirely by the experience in developed countries.  When we analyze the developing 
countries the coefficients for the antidumping variables do not have a consistent pattern, 
either in sign or statistical significance.  
When we include sectoral variation in the controls and allow for industry/country 
fixed effects (i.e., Tables 7 and 8), the explanatory power of antidumping use is less 
consistent. The econometric results suggest that antidumping was not an important 
component to reducing tariffs in the sample period for developing countries.  For developed 
countries, the positive relationship between antidumping use and trade liberalization found 
above was less robust and consistent than in the previous specification.  And this 
relationship was even more tenuous when we examined the immediate pre- and post-
Uruguay Round period for developed countries.  Finally, when we define trade 
liberalization in an alternative fashion, we see evidence that developing countries are less 
likely to reduce tariffs when they either launch investigations or impose antidumping duties 
in the same 3-digit ISIC sector.     31  
 
A final assessment about whether an antidumping process yields net economic 
benefits because of its impact on trade liberalization would require further work.  In 
principle, one would need to compare the economic inefficiencies created by the entire 
antidumping system with the possible increase in trade liberalization in developed countries 
indicated in this study.  The answer is ultimately an empirical question and our results shed 
little light on this subject other than to say that there is some evidence that such a trade-off 
might exist.  And our results say nothing about whether other trade policy “safety-valves,” 
such as safeguard actions or compensatory transfers to trade liberalization’s losers, would 
not have provided the same political “cover” but with fewer economic distortions.  
Nonetheless, there seem to be at least some weak and fragmentary evidence that 
antidumping proponents’ arguments that the system may help trade liberalization cannot be 
dismissed out of hand, at least for developed countries.  Developing countries trade reform 
efforts, on the other hand, seem to be, if anything, hindered by their own use of 
antidumping measures. 
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Australia  13.78  (1991)  4.66  (2001)  331  105  31.7% 
Canada  10.23  (1989)  4.09  (2004)  200  134  67.0% 
European Union  5.74  (1988)  3.82  (2003)  481  309  64.2% 
Japan  5.57  (1988)  5.04  (2003)  6  4  66.7% 
New Zealand  10.43  (1992)  4.14  (2002)  56  20  35.7% 
Norway  5.78  (1988)  0.45  (2003)  0  0  -- 
Switzerland  0.00  (1990)  0.00  (2004)  No AD law  No AD law  -- 
United States  5.43  (1989)  3.14  (2004)  559  282  50.4% 
Developed country average  7.12    3.17        52.6% 
               
Developing Countries             
 
Argentina   14.18  (1992)  14.35  (2002)  210  121  57.6% 
Bangladesh   117.98  (1989)  20.26  (2004)  0  0  -- 
Bolivia  9.90  (1993)  9.90  (2003)  0  0  -- 
Brazil   43.73  (1989)  14.10  (2004)  146  66  45.2% 
Chile   10.94  (1992)  6.96  (2002)  14  6  42.9% 
China   44.95  (1992)  13.34  (2002)  62  16  25.8% 
Colombia   7.60  (1991)  12.89  (2002)  38  21  55.3% 
Ecuador   10.66  (1993)  12.61  (2003)  4  2  50.0% 
Hungary  10.67  (1991)  6.83  (2002  0  0  -- 
India   58.32  (1992)  28.13  (2004)  325  215  66.2% 
Indonesia   25.53  (1989)  7.34  (2004)  37  15  40.5% 
Malaysia   18.17  (1988)  11.78  (2001)  17  11  64.7% 
Mexico   14.21  (1991)  18.56  (2001)  200  100  50.0% 
Nepal   19.65  (1993)  16.31  (2003)  No AD law  No AD law  -- 
Oman   5.28  (1992)  7.36  (2002)  No AD law  No AD law  -- 
Paraguay   19.77  (1991)  13.48  (2001)  2  1  50.0% 
Peru   18.70  (1993)  10.43  (2004)  88  40  45.5% 
Philippines   30.91  (1988)  4.88  (2003)  28  14  50.0% 
Saudi Arabia   12.55  (1994)  6.67  (2004)  0  0  -- 
South Africa   12.82  (1988)  9.67  (1998)  170  64  37.6% 
Tanzania   17.53  (1993)  15.26  (2003)  No AD law  No AD law  -- 
Thailand   44.27  (1989)  17.55  (2000)  9  6  66.7% 
Trinidad and Tobago  19.48  (1991)  8.76  (2001)  4  3  75.0% 
Tunisia  29.96  (1990)  26.14  (2003)  0  0  -- 
Turkey   9.74  (1993)  3.88  (2003)  75  38  50.7% 
Uruguay   7.89  (1992)  13.70  (2002)  4  2  50.0% 
Venezuela   20.04  (1992)  13.30  (2002)  26  16  61.5% 
Developing country average  24.27    12.76        51.8% 
               
Overall average  20.35    10.56        52.1% 
Notes: the years in parenthesis are for the first and last year included in the regressions; Antidumping 
initiations and measures are the totals for the period defined by the year in parenthesis (or shorter for 
countries that adopted an antidumping law sometimes in between) for ISIC 321-390.  36  
 
Table 2: Industry Classification and Summary Statistics 
 
 ISIC Classification (revision 2) 
Average 






311 Food products  -0.31  104  (3.22)  55  (3.29) 
312 Food products (others)  5.37  28  (0.87)  5  (0.30) 
313 Beverages  -23.12  3  (0.09)  1  (0.06) 
314 Tobacco  -20.93  1  (0.03)  0  (0.00) 
321 Textiles  8.23  212  (6.57)  91  (5.44) 
322 Wearing apparel except footwear  -4.65  38  (1.18)  11  (0.66) 
323 Leather products  16.10  8  (0.25)  1  (0.06) 
324 Footwear except rubber or plastic  12.02  45  (1.39)  31  (1.85) 
331 Wood products except furniture  17.36  8  (0.25)  7  (0.42) 
332 Furniture except metal  17.01  1  (0.03)  0  (0.00) 
341 Paper and products  17.76  124  (3.84)  53  (3.17) 
342 Printing and publishing  18.53  12  (0.37)  8  (0.48) 
351 Industrial chemicals  11.79  862  (26.70)  446  (26.67) 
352 Other chemicals  16.82  56  (1.73)  27  (1.61) 
353 Petroleum refineries  8.81  2  (0.03)  0  (0.00) 
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products  15.84  6  (0.19)  4  (0.24) 
355 Rubber products  14.00  44  (1.36)  25  (1.50) 
356 Plastic products  13.06  36  (1.12)  18  (1.08) 
361 Pottery china earthenware  13.75  1  (0.03)  1  (0.06) 
362 Glass and products  15.80  67  (2.08)  23  (1.38) 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products  17.75  55  (1.70)  30  (1.79) 
371 Iron and steel  9.13  882  (27.32)  492  (29.43) 
372 Non-ferrous metals  12.91  55  (1.70)  24  (1.44) 
381 Fabricated metal products  14.93  114  (3.53)  75  (4.49) 
382 Machinery except electrical  17.59  125  (3.87)  62  (3.71) 
383 Machinery electric  18.92  149  (4.62)  91  (5.44) 
384 Transport equipment  14.32  42  (1.30)  20  (1.20) 
385 Professional and scientific equipment  18.08  63  (1.95)  25  (1.50) 
390 Other manufactured products  18.02  85  (2.63)  46  (2.75) 
Overall  10.86  3,228    1,672   
Notes:  100
5 , ,
5 , , , ,
, , x t
t i k t
t i k t t i k t










so that tariff reductions are positive numbers; antidumping initiations 
and measures are the totals for the periods defined in Table 1; percentages of total cases reported in 
parenthesis. 
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Table 3: Data Description 
 
  Description  Source 
Dependent Variable     
Sectoral Trade Liberalization  Negative of percentage change (5 years) in SECTOR_TARIFF   
     
Explanatory Variables      
SECTOR_TARIFF  Sector simple average of applied tariff rates  World Bank (2001) 
SECTOR_TARIFF_SQUARED  (SECTOR_TARIFF)
2  World Bank (2001) 
COUNTRY_TARIFF  Country simple average of applied tariff rates  World Bank (2001) 
COUNTRY_TARIFF_SQUARED  (COUNTRY_TARIFF)
2  World Bank (2001) 
GDP/CAP  Three year average of GDP per capita  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
INFLATION  Three year average of percentage change of GDP deflator (or 
consumer prices) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 
GROWTH  Three year average of growth of real GDP per capita  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
CA/GDP  Three year average of current account as a percentage of GDP  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
IMF NON-CONCESSIONARY   Three year average of net IMF nonconcessional loans as a 
percentage of GDP 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 
IBRD  Three year average of net IBRD loans as a percentage of GDP  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
IDA  Three year average of net IDA loans as a percentage of GDP  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
SECTOR_AD_INIT  Number of AD petitions initiated in a sector  Collected by authors from government sources. 
SECTOR_AD_MEAS  Number of AD measures imposed in a sector  Collected by authors from government sources. 
SECTOR_AD_INIT_3  Three year average of SECTOR_AD_INIT  Collected by authors from government sources. 
SECTOR_AD_MEAS_3  Three year average of SECTOR_AD_MEAS  Collected by authors from government sources. 
SECTOR_AD_INIT_5  Five year average of SECTOR_AD_INIT  Collected by authors from government sources. 
SECTOR_AD_MEAS_5  Five year average of SECTOR_AD_MEAS  Collected by authors from government sources. 
COUNTRY_AD_INIT  Country average of SECTOR_AD_INIT  Collected by authors from government sources. 
COUNTRY_AD_MEAS  Country average of SECTOR_AD_MEAS  Collected by authors from government sources. 
COUNTRY_AD_INIT_3  Country average of SECTOR_AD_INIT_3  Collected by authors from government sources. 
COUNTRY_AD_MEAS_3  Country average of SECTOR_AD_MEAS_3  Collected by authors from government sources. 
Notes: Alessandro Nicita kindly provided an update to 2004 of the data available from World Bank (2001).   38  
 
Table 4: All Countries  
 
  Mean 
(Std. Dev.)  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3  Column 4  Column 5  Column 6 
Dependent variable: Average Sectoral 
Tariff Reduction  
10.93 
(72.31) 































































































    0.099 
(0.074) 




      1.379*** 
(0.162) 










          0.366*** 
(0.100) 
Country Fixed Effects (Prob > F)    Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects (Prob > F)      Y (0.28)  Y (0.28)  Y (0.26)  Y (0.27)  Y (0.28) 
R-squared    0.16  0.18  0.18  0.19  0.18  0.18 
Observations    2,261  2,261  2,261  2,261  2,261  2,261 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively; Prob > F reports the probability of the joint 
test that all fixed effect are statistically significant; i) All variables are lagged to the base year used in the calculation of the tariff reduction.     39  
 
Table 5: Developed Countries 
 
  Mean 
(Std. Dev.)  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3  Column 4  Column 5 























































































  0.641*** 
(0.162) 




    1.567*** 
(0.224) 










        3.027*** 
(0.305) 
Country Fixed Effects (Prob > F)    Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects (Prob > F)    Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00) 
R-squared    0.37  0.39  0.42  0.44  0.48 
Observations    582  582  582  582  582 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively; Prob > F reports the 
probability of the joint test that all fixed effect are statistically significant; i) All variables are lagged to the base year used in the calculation of 
the tariff reduction.     40  
 
Table 6: Developing Countries 
 
  Mean 
(Std. Dev.)  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3  Column 4  Column 5 























































































  0.288** 
(0.138) 




    0.635 
(0.413) 










        -0.280** 
(0.118) 
Country Fixed Effects (Prob > F)    Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects (Prob > F)    Y (0.64)  Y (0.64)  Y (0.64)  Y (0.64)  Y (0.63) 
R-squared    0.18  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.18 
Observations    1,679  1,679  1,679  1,679  1,679 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively; Prob > F reports the 
probability of the joint test that all fixed effect are statistically significant; i) All variables are lagged to the base year used in the calculation of 
the tariff reduction.     41  
 
Table 7: Developed Countries 
 
  Mean 
(Std. Dev.)  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3  Column 4  Column 5  Column 6 









































































































  2.209* 
(1.230) 




    0.494** 
(0.247) 




      0.785 
(0.560) 










          -0.370 
(0.594) 
Country/Industry Fixed Effects (Prob > F)    Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00) 
R-squared    0.61  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60 
Observations    582  582  582  582  572  572 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively; Prob > F reports the probability of the joint 
test that all fixed effect are statistically significant; Means and standard deviations calculated for the 582 observations used in the first four columns, except for 
SECTOR_AD_INIT_5 and SECTOR_AD_MEAS_5 whose means and standard deviations are calculated over 572 observations; i) All variables are lagged to 
the base year used in the calculation of the tariff reduction. 
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Table 8: Developing Countries 
 
  Mean 
(Std. Dev.)  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3  Column 4  Column 5  Column 6 









































































































  1.964 
(1.869) 




    0.229 
(0.526) 




      0.202 
(0.780) 










          0.386 
(0.734) 
Country/Industry Fixed Effects (Prob > F)    Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00) 
R-squared    0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.58  0.58 
Observations    1,679  1,679  1,679  1,679  1,650  1,650 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively; Prob > F reports the probability of the joint 
test that all fixed effect are statistically significant; Means and standard deviations calculated for the 1,679 observations used in the first four columns, except for 
SECTOR_AD_INIT_5 and SECTOR_AD_MEAS_5 whose means and standard deviations are calculated over 1,650 observations; i) All variables are lagged to 
the base year used in the calculation of the tariff reduction.   43  
 
Table 9: Sensitivity Results 
 
 
  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3  Column 4  Column 5  Column 6  Column 7  Column 8 
Dependent variable: Average Sectoral 
Tariff Reduction 








































































































IMF NON-CONCESSIONARY  





























      0.997 
(0.823) 
     
SECTOR_AD_MEAS 
  0.346 
(0.810) 
      1.684 
(1.923) 
   
SECTOR_AD_INIT_3 
    0.053 
(0.111) 




      0.139 
(0.248) 
      -0.139 
(0.780) 
Country/Industry Fixed Effects (Prob > F)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00)  Y (0.00) 
R-squared  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57 
Observations  251  251  251  251  1,679  1,679  1,679  1,679 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively; Prob > F reports the probability of the 
joint test that all fixed effect are statistically significant; i) All variables are lagged to the base year used in the calculation of the tariff reduction. 